Home // COCORA 2014, The Fourth International Conference on Advances in Cognitive Radio // View article
Authors:
Wenson Chang
Yu-Ping Lin
Szu-Lin Su
Keywords: Game theory, auction, cognitive radio, pricing, spectrum leasing
Abstract:
In this paper, we propose a low-complexity spectrum leasing game for the underlay CR network with PS using adaptive rate-based pricing strategy. In the proposed scenario, an SU can make a request for sharing a channel with multiple PUs and pay for the spectrum lease in proportional to his transmission power. In the meantime, the PUs can determine the leasing price to maximize his own revenue at the cost of ignorable throughput degradation; In other words, one can say that the PU can actively protect himself from using the lower transmission rate by adaptively rising the leasing prize, rather than passively imposing interference-limit rule as in the conventional methods. The simulation results show that the proposed spectrum leasing game can grant SUs transmission opportunities without causing PUs throughput degradation. Moreover, the convergency of the proposed scheme is numerically proved, which accounts for the existence of Nash Equilibrium.
Pages: 14 to 19
Copyright: Copyright (c) IARIA, 2014
Publication date: February 23, 2014
Published in: conference
ISSN: 2308-4251
ISBN: 978-1-61208-323-0
Location: Nice, France
Dates: from February 23, 2014 to February 27, 2014