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Authors:
Ricardo Buettner
Jürgen Landes
Keywords: Vickrey-Clarke-Groves auction; web service; electronic human resource management; mechanism design; multi-dimensional price
Abstract:
We design an efficient and transaction cost reducing Vickrey-Clarke-Groves auction as part of a web service for the work allocation problem in temporary employment agencies. In this auction bids are work contracts with multi-dimensional salaries. To compute the allocation we assume that every temporary employment worker conveys a utility function specifying the utility gained from working a given job for a salary consisting of multiple components. We then embed the designed mechanism in an updated transaction phase model describing the repeated allocation of temporary agency workers to work assignments. We prove that the designed auction mechanism at the heart of the web service satisfies Incentive Compatibility and Pareto Efficiency.
Pages: 168 to 177
Copyright: Copyright (c) IARIA, 2012
Publication date: May 27, 2012
Published in: conference
ISSN: 2308-3972
ISBN: 978-1-61208-200-4
Location: Stuttgart, Germany
Dates: from May 27, 2012 to June 1, 2012