Maude-NPA

Repository of protocol specifications in Maude-NPA

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Denning Sacco Protocol

The protocol specification in "Alice-Bob" notation is as follows.

  1. (1) A -> B : A,B
  2. (2) S -> A : E(Kas:B,Kab,T,E(Kbs:A,Kab,T))
  3. (3) A -> B : E(Kbs:A,Kab,T)

This protocol has three participants. The specifications of these participants in Maude-NPA are as follows:

Click here to see the specification of the participants in Maude-NPA

For this protocol we considered the following three executions:
  1. A regular execution of the protocol (denoted by attack-state(0)).
  2. An execution in which the intruder finds out the Session key generated by the server (denoted by attack-state(1)).
  3. An execution in which Bob completed his protocol execution believing he was communicating with Alice, but it actually was not so (denoted attack-state (2)).

After the analysis of this protocol in Maude-NPA, the tool found an initial state corresponding to attack-state(0), which shows a completed regular execution of the protocol. However, Maude-NPA did not find any initial state for any of the other two attack states. Therefore, the protocol is secure.

To download the complete protocol specification in Maude-NPA syntax and the outputs, click HERE